Mr. Chairman,

I congratulate you on assumption of the important responsibility of Chairing MX5 and assure you of full cooperation and support of my delegation to you for steering our meeting to a successful outcome.

2.       I would like to thank the United Kingdom, United States and the Russian Federation for presenting their Working Papers in the framework of MX5.  I wish to congratulate the Russian Federation on the successful organization of the Sochi Conference on Biosecurity, which I had the privilege to participate in and was honored to facilitate the discussions on National Implementation. 

3.       Institutional strengthening is a key aspect to ensure full and effective implementation of the Convention which in turn requires implementation of all the articles of BWC.  Any Convention or Treaty is as good as its implementation by the States Parties. National implementation has remained uneven and more concerted and coordinated efforts are necessary.

4.       The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at the 2018 MSP had noted that, “Although its strong norm against biological warfare is being adhered to by a growing number of States Parties, we must admit that the BWC is institutionally weak when compared to similar regimes”.

5.       Over the years, States Parties have focused on Articles V, Article VI, Article VII, CBMs as well as universality of the Convention.

6.       As of today, 182 States are a party to BWC. Bringing the remaining States on board is one of the major challenges in effective implementation of the Convention. One of our main aims, therefore, should be universalisation of the Convention. Any Treaty, for its universalisation should provide both incentives to join and disincentives for withdrawing from it. One of the major incentives for joining the Convention is opportunity for States Parties to receive assistance and protection against the malicious use of biological agents. Article VII of BWC provides for assistance, however, the Convention “contains no operational capacity to respond to biological attacks”. Rendering assistance is a legal obligation under Article VII of the Convention. It is clear that the absence of clearly laid out procedures for seeking assistance, and the associated techno-political-legal questions related to Article VII, have led to a deficit in the ability of the global community to respond effectively and provide assistance to States Parties exposed to dangers as a result of violation of the BWC.  In this context, India and France have proposed establishment of a database for assistance in the framework of Article VII.

7.       With rapid developments in Science and Technology resulting in ease of access to dual use technologies to various non-State actors, the threat from bio-terrorism has grown. Under paragraph 2 of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), which reinforces BWC obligations, States are required to adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws.  As per the final document on the 2016 comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540, the overall implementation rate of obligations under para 2 was at 62%, with regional disparities. The Report further noted that only 103 States have in place export control legislation for materials related to biological weapons and their means of delivery, and only 83 States, have taken measures to implement the relevant licensing provisions. This is a clear indication of the deficit in implementation of Article III of BWC. Recognizing the importance of building broad-based support for strengthening implementation of Article III, India, along with the United States, has submitted a Working Paper titled ‘Strengthening Implementation of Article III of the BTWC’. Effective implementation of Article III would also ensure that cooperation envisaged under Article X is taken forward in mutual confidence. Equitable benefits for States Parties, in particular developing countries, resulting from effective implementation of Article X, will also help in promoting universalisation of the Convention.

8.       In the absence of verifiable monitoring mechanism under the Convention, CBMs have served as an important transparency measure to enhance trust but are not a substitute for an effective mechanism for verification and compliance. The utility of the CBMs has been limited due to the irregular submission and sub-optimal quality and there is clearly a need for quantitative and qualitative improvements in the date collected through CBMs.

9.       Another important aspect relates to Article V of the BWC. While efforts have been made to develop consultative procedures and processes, the consultative mechanism under Article V remains underdeveloped and underutilized.  Further, unilateral actions by States Parties to assess compliance by other States Parties does not bode well for the Convention, as it runs the risk of politicization.

10.     Article VI allows a State Party to request the UN Security Council to investigate alleged breaches of the BWC by another State Party. India has maintained that issues related to alleged use should be addressed by the States Parties in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

11.     Unlike CWC, BWC lacks a Technical Secretariat. While, an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) exists, it lacks adequate resources both financial and human and is not able to meet effectively the growing demands on the Convention and the increasing expectations of the States Parties. There is thus a need to strengthen the ISU and place it on a firm and sustainable footing.

12.     It is equally important that we strengthen the Inter-Sessional Process, particularly the MSPs and reinforce their authority for taking and implementing effective decisions.       

13.     As was highlighted by India at the 8th Review Conference, it is clear that the lack of a comprehensive Protocol to strengthen implementation of all aspects of the BWC has created a gap in the effective implementation of the BWC. While recognising that there is no consensus on commencing negotiations for a legally binding Protocol at present, India strongly believes that the long-term sustainability of the Convention should be rooted in legally binding measures with States Parties endowing collective confidence in the Convention.

14.     The UN Secretary General, in his address to the UNGA in 2018 recognised, ‘protections against dangerous biological weapons are weak’. This is a reminder to reinvigorate our collective efforts to strengthen the Convention. India stands ready to work with fellow States Parties for institutional strengthening of the Convention in order to effectively implement all provisions of the Convention.

Thank you.