CD Subsidiary Body 1 on ‘Cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament’

August 2, 2018

Nuclear Disarmament Verification

Statement by India

Mr. Co-ordinator,

For today’s meeting, you have asked us to reflect on nuclear disarmament verification. We thank you for putting forward some relevant initial guiding questions that I shall try and address in my statement.

In our view, Mr Co-ordinator, verification remains an integral and critical pillar of any instrument to be negotiated with regard to nuclear disarmament. Verification would be essential to provide the necessary assurance regarding compliance by all States parties with the future instrument’s provisions.

India is participating in the recently constituted GGE on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, established pursuant to UNGA Resolution 71/67, in view of the importance of the increasing common understanding on international effective verification in multilateral legal instruments for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, which would also be an essential element of a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention.

On your first question, Mr Co-ordinator, on what could constitute effective and adequate nuclear disarmament verification, firstly, we believe that in order to be effective, nuclear disarmament must essentially be verifiable, as also universal and non-discriminatory. Nuclear disarmament, of which verification is an integral inseparable part, must be pursued multilaterally through a legally-binding instrument with due regard to the principle of consensus while ensuring the participation of all States possessing nuclear weapons. For verification to be adequate, the parameters of effectiveness i.e.  providing requisite assurances with regard to compliance versus the costs of verification and acceptability in the light of concerns regarding national security and/or proliferation as also protection of national confidential information would have to be considered and a balance between these would have to be struck. This would also be in response to your last question, Mr Co-ordinator, on how to strike a balance between national security concerns and the requisite level of access and assurance.

Further, we must bear in mind that it is important to not only attain a world free of nuclear weapons, but to also maintain it through a verification regime that is applicable in a universal and non-discriminatory manner.

On your second question, Mr Co-ordinator, on whether we can develop broad guidelines, yes, we believe that is possible for us to pursue the development of such broad guidelines based on established principles. The 16 Principles on Verification for instance, agreed to by consensus in the UNDC in 1988, could provide guidance to this process, as also the outcome document of the first Special Session on Disarmament. This work is also being taken forward in the GGE on Nuclear Disarmament Verification which held its first meeting earlier this year, as highlighted by the delegate of Norway earlier in her statement.

On what lessons can be drawn from nuclear disarmament verification experience and initiative, Mr. Co-ordinator, States that have undertaken dismantlement of their nuclear weapons may wish to share their verification experiences, which would help in understanding whether at all any lessons can be learnt from these unilateral or bilateral endeavours that could be useful in the multilateral context.

Your next question asks if there a need for more research and analytical work. In our view, given the highly technical nature of nuclear disarmament verification, there is certainly value in pursuing further research and analytical work. India acknowledges the utility of technical work on verification as proposed in Resolution 71/67. At the same time, it would be important to point out that any such work done in a forum such as the GGE cannot prejudge the nature and scope of any eventual nuclear disarmament instrument, which would in turn impact on the verification elements to be agreed specific to that instrument.

Finally, Mr Co-ordinator, you enquire which multilateral organizations would be best equipped to conduct nuclear disarmament verification, and whether new ones should be created to carry out the task. In our view, verification will flow naturally from the object and purpose of the instrument negotiated to address nuclear disarmament in a comprehensive manner. Any role for say, the IAEA, would be limited to what is specified in the IAEA Statute. Relevant verification experience from a treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction and providing for their internationally verifiable elimination, namely the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), could also be usefully studied in this context. International and effective verification also remains an important aspect of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

Thank you, Mr. Co-ordinator.